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Abstract
We identify emergence with the existence of states of potentiality related to relevant physi-
cal quantities. We introduce the concept of ‘potentiality state’ operationally and show how
it reduces to ‘superposition state’ when standard quantum mechanics can be applied. We
consider several examples to illustrate our approach, and define the potentiality states giv-
ing rise to emergence in each example. We prove that Bell inequalities are violated by the
potentiality states in the examples, which, taking into account Pitowsky’s theorem, exper-
imentally indicates the presence of quantum structure in emergence. In the first example
emergence arises because of the many ways water can be subdivided into different vessels. In
the second example, we put forward a full quantum description of the Liar paradox situation,
and identify the potentiality states, which in this case turn out to be superposition states.
In the example of the soccer team, we show the difference between classical emergence as
stable dynamical pattern and emergence defined by a potentiality state, and show how Bell
inequalities can be violated in the case of highly contextual experiments.
1 Introduction
Many everyday life examples of emergence can be given. Let us consider for instance a set of soccer
players. As long as it is just a set of soccer players no emergence takes place. Suppose however
that the set of players starts to practice with the aim of forming a soccer team. The co-adaptation
that takes place between the different soccer players during their trainings and matches results in
the emergence of a soccer team. The soccer team is a new structure that has been formed out of
the set of individual soccer players.
In physics emergent phenomena have been studied within the complexity and chaos approach.
An example is given by the Be´nard convection effect. This effect occurs when a viscous fluid
is heated between two planes. In the pre-boiling stage and under suitable conditions, bubbles
begin to rise and vortices — called Be´nard cells — arise like little cylinders within which the
fluid continuously streams up on the outside of the cylinder and back down through the middle
of the cylinder. This motion occurs as the fluid heats up and before it starts to boil. The Be´nard
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cells fit together in a hexagonal lattice of vortices, even without partitions to keep the boundaries
between the vortices stable. The microscopical movements of the individual molecules of the fluid
result in a macroscopical dynamical pattern of the fluid as a whole with the emergent Be´nard cell
structure.
The existing complexity and chaos models are classical physics models. In this paper we want
to show that a classical physics approach has to be generalized in order to describe emergence
in a complete way. The reason is that the emergent structure usually contains states that have
a relation of ‘potential’ with respect to relevant observable quantities. We will call such states
‘potentiality states’. These emergent potentiality states cannot be described in a classical physics
approach but need a quantum-like formalism. We know that the appearance of potentiality states
is a basic aspect of quantum mechanics. Therefore, in this paper we will demonstrate not only
the importance of potentiality states for emergence, but also the advantage of a quantum-like
description of emergence versus a classical one. In the examples we will indicate in which way
the quantum-like formalism appears in the description. The relevance of quantum aspects in
emergence confirms earlier results in which quantum mechanical aspects in the macroscopic world
are identified in a more general way [1, 7].
In physics, the state q(t) of a physical entity S at time t represents the reality of this physical
entity at that time t.1 In the case of classical physics such a state is represented by a point
in phase space, while for quantum physics it is represented by a unit vector in Hilbert space.
In classical physics the state q(t) of a physical entity S determines the values for all observable
quantities at this time t. Hence it is common in classical physics to characterize the state q(t)
by the set of all values of the relevant observable quantities. For example, if the physical entity
is a particle S(classical particle), then the relevant observable quantities are its position r(t)
and momentum p(t) at time t. And indeed, for each state q(t) of S(classical particle), it is the
case that r(t) and p(t) have definite values, which makes it possible to represent q(t) with the
couple (r(t), p(t)) in phase space. In quantum physics the situation is different. The state q(t) of a
quantum particle S(quantum particle) is represented by a unit vector ψ(r, t) (the normalized wave
function) in a Hilbert space L2(R3). Again, the relevant observable quantities are the position and
the momentum. However, neither has definite values for the entity S(quantum particle) being in
a state ψ(r, t). To be more specific, definite values of position exist only if the wave function is
a delta function, and definite values of momentum if the wave function is a plane wave.2 Apart
from the fact that in both cases the wave function is not an element of the Hilbert space L2(R3),
and hence should be considered as limiting cases, they never can occur together. This means that
a quantum particle never has simultaneously a definite position and a definite momentum, which
is referred to as ‘quantum indeterminism’. It can also be expressed as follows: for a quantum
particle in state ψ(r, t) the values of position and momentum are potential. This means that the
quantum particle has the potential of realizing them, but they are not actually realized in the
state ψ(r, t).
1In physics ‘statistical states’ are sometimes also just called states. We however will always refer with the
concept state to what is called a ‘pure state’.
2If one chooses as the basis of the Hilbert space an orthonormal set of eigenstates corresponding with the position
operator, i.e. the state is expressed as a (wave) function Ψ(x1, . . . , xn; t) of variables given by the coordinates xi.
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Previously it has been shown that whether a specific physical entity needs a quantum-like
description — and hence should be called a quantum entity — or a classical description, depends
on the nature of the entity and the relevant observable quantities, and not on the fact that it
belongs to the microworld or to the macroworld [1, 7].
Because of their importance for emergence we will concentrate on the presence of potentiality
states and how without difficulties many situations can be found in the macroscopic world con-
taining this quantum aspect. However, they can not be described by classical physical theories
which identify emergent properties of a specific entity with stable dynamical patterns of the entity.
The concept of potentiality state makes it possible to describe another type of emergence which is
present on an ontological level and not on the dynamic level as in the case of classical emergence.
In standard quantum mechanics a potentiality state related to a specific observable quantity is
a superposition state of the eigenstates of this observable quantity. Hence, our potentiality states
are superposition states for a situation where standard quantum physics applies. To demonstrate
the more general applicability of the concept of potentiality state, we will consider situations
that have both quantum and classical aspects and hence are not purely quantum. However for
such situations there does not necessarily exist a Hilbert space describing the set of states, as
is the case in pure quantum situations, meaning that superposition is not well defined. That is
the reason that we use the name potentiality states instead of superposition states for the states
that we consider. In the second example of this paper (see section 3), the liar paradox, we will
see that the description is fully quantum, such that in this case the potentiality states reduce
to superposition states. In the last section we give the example of a team of soccer players to
illustrate the difference between emergence due to potentiality states, which is on an ontological
level, and classical emergence, defined by dynamical patterns.
2 Bell Inequalities and Non-classical Emergence
In this section we consider several examples and analyze in which way the concept of potentiality
state appears. We also investigate in which way the presence of potentiality states is linked to the
violation of Bell inequalities.
2.1 Potentiality States in Connected Vessels of Water
Suppose that we consider two vessels of which one contains 6 liters of water and the other one
14 liters of water. We have at our disposal a third vessel that is empty, but can contain more
than 20 liters of water. The entity S(water) is the water, and we consider the physical quantity
which is the volume of the water. Clearly this physical quantity has a definite value for the water
that is contained in the two considered vessels, namely 6 liters and 14 liters. This means that the
states of water that we consider in both vessels are not potentiality states related to the observable
quantity which is the volume.
Suppose now that we take the two vessels and empty them in the third vessel. This third vessel
will then contain 20 liters of water, which means that also for this new entity of water the physical
quantity volume has a definite value. But by putting the water of the two vessels together, the
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new entity of water has lost the old properties of 6 liters and 14 liters as actual properties. We
could however divide the water again and collect 6 liters in one vessel and 14 liters in the other
vessel. This means that potentially the division in 6 liters and 14 liters is still present in the
entity of 20 liters of water. But this new state of 20 liters of water contains many more possible
subdivisions as potentialities. Also 8 liters and 12 liters, or 11 liters and 9 liters, or 2 liters and
18 liters,. . . are all potentialities of subdivisions. In general we can say that x liters and y liters of
water, such that x + y = 20 form an infinite continuous set of potential subdivisions. Therefore,
from the third vessel, being in the state such that it contains 20 liters, the two subentities can
be derived by dividing the 20 liters in the appropriate amounts. The state of 20 liters of water
is a potentiality state related to measurements that divide the amount of water in two amounts.
Taking into account the measurement that subdivides an amount of water in two, the 20 liters
of water, that originated by putting together the original 6 liters and 14 liters has new emergent
properties. These properties are described by the potentiality state, that allows the water to be
subdivided in all these ways.
If we connect the two original vessels by a tube, we get such a third vessel (see Figure 1).
We can show that the new properties that this entity has are emergent properties related to
measurements that divide the water up again. A criterion that we can use to show the quantum
nature of these emergent properties is the violation of Bell inequalities. We will recall in the
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Figure 1: The vessels of water example violating Bell inequalities. The entity S consists of two vessels containing
20 liters of water that are connected by a tube.
next section Bell inequalities and then elaborate our connected vessels of water example with the
necessary detail such that we can show that Bell inequalities are violated. The vessels of water
example was introduced in [1] and elaborated in [3, 4, 7, 8].
2.2 Bell Inequalities and the Presence of Quantum Structure
Violation of Bell inequalities related to the presence of potentiality states can happen as well in
the macroworld as in the microworld, depending on the type of states and observable quantities
that are considered. Let us first recall some of the most relevant historical results related to Bell
inequalities, and show why the violation of Bell inequalities is an experimental indication for the
presence of quantum aspects.
In the seventies, a sequence of experiments was carried out to test for the presence of nonlocality
in the microworld described by quantum mechanics [9, 14], culminating in decisive experiments
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by Aspect and his team in Paris [15, 16]. They were inspired by three important theoretical
results: the EPR Paradox [17], Bohm’s thought experiment [18], and Bell’s theorem [19]. Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen believed to have shown that quantum mechanics is incomplete, in that there
exist elements of reality that cannot be described by it [17, 20, 21]. Bohm took their insight further
with a simple example: the ‘coupled spin-1
2
entity’ consisting of two particles with spin-1
2
, of which
the spins are coupled such that the quantum spin vector is a non-product vector representing a
singlet spin state [18]. Bohm’s example inspired Bell to formulate a condition that would test
experimentally for incompleteness, the Bell inequalities [19]. Bell’s theorem states that statistical
results of experiments performed on a certain physical entity satisfy his inequalities if and only if
the reality in which this physical entity is embedded is local. Experiments performed to test for
the presence of nonlocality confirmed the results as predicted by quantum mechanics, such that
it is now commonly accepted that the micro-physical world is incompatible with local realism.
Bell inequalities are defined with the following experimental situation in mind. We consider a
physical entity S, and four experiments e1, e2, e3, and e4 that can be performed on the physical
entity S. Each of the experiments ei, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} has two possible outcomes, respectively de-
noted oi(up) and oi(down). Some of the experiments can be performed together, which in principle
leads to ‘coincidence’ experiments eij, i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. For example ei and ej together will be de-
noted eij. Such a coincidence experiment eij has four possible outcomes, namely (oi(up), oj(up)),
(oi(up), oj(down)), (oi(down), oj(up)) and (oi(down), oj(down)). Following Bell [19], we define the
expectation values Eij, i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} for these coincidence experiments, as
Eij = (+1)P (oi(up), oj(up)) + (+1)P (oi(down), oj(down))+
(−1)P (oi(up), oj(down)) + (−1)P (oi(down), oj(up)) (1)
From the assumption that the outcomes are either +1 or −1, and that the correlation Eij can be
written as an integral over some hidden variable of a product of the two local outcome assignments,
one derives Bell inequalities:
|E13 − E14|+ |E23 + E24| ≤ 2 (2)
To come to the point where we can use the violation of Bell inequalities as an experimental
indication for the presence of quantum structure, we have to mention the work of Itamar Pitowsky.
Pitowsky proved that if Bell inequalities are satisfied for a set of probabilities connected to the
outcomes of the considered experiments, there exists a classical Kolmogorovian probability model.
In such model the probability can be explained as due to a lack of knowledge about the precise state
of the system. If however Bell inequalities are violated, Pitowsky proved that no such classical
Kolmogorovian probability model exists [22]. Hence violation of Bell inequalities shows that the
probabilities that are involved are nonclassical. The only type of nonclassical probabilities that
are well known in nature are the quantum probabilities. The probability structure that is present
in our examples3 is nonclassical and nonquantum, the classical and quantum probabilities being
two special cases of this more general situation.
3Except for the liar paradox example, where we derive a pure quantum description and hence the probability
model is quantum.
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2.3 Violation of Bell Inequalities for the Connected Vessels of Water Entity
Let us consider again the entity S(connected vessels) of two vessels connected by a tube and
containing 20 liters of transparent water (see Figure 1). The entity is in an emergent potentiality
state s such that the vessel is placed in the gravitational field of the earth, with its bottom
horizontal. To be able to check for the violation of Bell inequalities caused by this potentiality
state we have to introduce four measurements, of which some can be performed together.
Let us introduce the experiment e1 that consists of putting a siphon K1 in the vessel of water at
the left, taking out water using the siphon, and collecting this water in a reference vessel R1 placed
to the left of the vessel. If we collect more than 10 liters of water, we call the outcome o1(up),
and if we collect less or equal to 10 liters, we call the outcome o1(down). We introduce another
experiment e2 that consists of taking with a little spoon, from the left, a bit of the water, and
determining whether it is transparent. We call the outcome o2(up) when the water is transparent
and the outcome o2(down) when it is not. We introduce the experiment e3 that consists of putting
a siphon K3 in the vessel of water at the right, taking out water using the siphon, and collecting
this water in a reference vessel R3 to the right of the vessel. If we collect more or equal to 10 liters
of water, we call the outcome o3(up), and if we collect less than 10 liters, we call the outcome
o3(down). We also introduce the experiment e4 which is analogous to experiment e2, except that
we perform it to the right of the vessel (see Figure 1).
The experiment e1 can be performed together with experiments e3 and e4, and we denote
the coincidence experiments e13 and e14. Also, experiment e2 can be performed together with
experiments e3 and e4, and we denote the coincidence experiments e23 and e24. For the vessel
in state s, the coincidence experiment e13 always gives one of the outcomes (o1(up), o3(down)) or
(o1(down), o3(up)), since more than 10 liters of water can never come out of the vessel at both
sides. This shows that E13 = −1. The coincidence experiment e14 always gives the outcome
(o1(up), o4(up)) which shows that E14 = +1, and the coincidence experiment e23 always gives the
outcome (o2(up), o3(up)) which shows that E23 = +1. Clearly experiment e24 always gives the
outcome (o2(up), o4(up)) which shows that E24 = +1. Let us now calculate the terms of Bell
inequalities,
|E13 − E14|+ |E23 + E24| = | − 1− 1|+ |+ 1 + 1|
= +2 + 2
= +4
(3)
This shows that Bell inequalities are violated. The state s, which is a potentiality state related
to the measurements that divide up the 20 liters of water in the two reference vessels, is at the
origin of this violation.
3 States of Potentiality and the Liar Paradox
3.1 The Cognitive Entity of the Liar Paradox
Another example of an entity for which a description with potentiality states is useful, is given by
the double liar paradox. In fact, it will turn out that the double liar paradox entity S(double liar)
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can be given a pure quantum mechanical description. As we shall show below, the potentiality
state of this entity will be given by a superposition state of the states of the sub-entities which
compose the double liar entity. Before discussing the double liar paradox, let us first consider
some non-paradoxical situations:
(S 0.1) The sum of two and two is four.
(S 0.2) This page contains 1764 letters.
(S 0.3) The square root of 1764 is 42.
(S 0.4) 6 times 9 yields 42.
Obviously, the truth-value of each sentence can be easily determined. The fact that 2 + 2 = 4 can
also be expressed by the set of following two sentences:
(S 1.1) Sentence (S 1.2) is true.
(S 1.2) The sum of two and two is four.
The truth behavior of the entity, consisting of the set of sentences (S 1.1) and (S 1.2), can also be
determined rather easily. The truth values of the sentences are coupled, but we do not encounter
any paradoxical situations. This happens if both sentences refer to the truth value of each other.
In such case, paradoxical situations arise. Let us now consider the double liar paradox which can
be presented in the following way:
‘Double Liar’
(1) sentence (2) is false
(2) sentence (1) is true
Let us describe a typical cognitive interaction that one goes through with these liar paradox
sentences. Suppose we hypothesize that sentence (1) is true. We go to sentence (1) and read
what is written there. It is written ‘sentence (2) is false’. From our hypothesis we can infer that
sentence (2) is false. Let us go, using this knowledge about the status of sentence (2), to sentence
(2). There is written ‘sentence (1) is true’. From the knowledge that sentence (2) is false, we can
infer that sentence (1) is false. This means that from the hypothesis that sentence (1) is true we
derive that sentence (1) is false, which is a contradiction. Similarly, starting from the hypothesis
that sentence (1) is false one also obtains a contradiction.
In the examples presented in the previous section the presence of potentiality states gives rise
to the violation of Bell inequalities, which implies that there is no classical, i.e., Kolmogorovian,
representation possible [22]. Therefore in general, potentiality states are nonclassical states. In
[23, 24] the entity which is the liar sentence is studied in a similar perspective. In the description
of the liar entity we interpret the interaction that a person has with this entity, as described in
some detail in the forgoing sections, as a measurement. It is with the introduction of the concept
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of entity and of measurement (or observable quantity) in this operational way, that we can find
out what the nature is of this liar entity. It turns out that the liar entity can be described using
the formalism of standard quantum mechanics in a complex Hilbert space. Moreover, the self-
referential circularity — more precisely, the truth-value dynamics — of the liar paradox can be
described by the Schro¨dinger equation.
3.2 Quantum Representation for the Potentiality State of the Liar Paradox
A potentiality state is necessary to represent the state of the entity defined by the liar paradox
since its state is not an eigenstate of ‘truth’ (i.e., the sentence(s) are true) neither an eigenstate of
‘falsehood’ (i.e., the sentences are not true). Instead, the state of the liar entity can be regarded as a
potentiality state related to the measurements introduced by the persons that interact cognitively
with the liar entity. Since we find a full quantum description in this case, it follows that the
potentiality state is a superposition state of both eigenstates, just as the singlet state in the case
of two correlated spin-1
2
entities.
Let us discuss the Double Liar sentences in more detail by considering following three situations:
A
{
(1) sentence (2) is false
(2) sentence (1) is true
B
{
(1) sentence (2) is true
(2) sentence (1) is true
C
{
(1) sentence (2) is false
(2) sentence (1) is false
Since truth value of a sentence is binary: either it is true or it is false, we can associate the
outcomes of a dichotomic observable (e.g., the outcomes for a spin-1
2
outcome are either ‘spin up’
or ‘spin down’) with truth and falsehood. Let us make the convention that the ‘spin up’ state(
1
0
)
corresponds with truth of a sentence and ‘spin down’ state
(
0
1
)
with the falsehood of the
respective sentence. It turns out that then for the paradoxes of type B and C the sentences can
be represented by coupled C2 vectors. Indeed, since for each measurement the truth values of the
two sentences are coupled (B1 true implies B2 true and B1 false implies B2 false, C1 true implies
C2 false and vice versa), the dimensionality of C2⊗C2 is sufficient to represent these entities.
Formally, the corresponding quantum mechanical representation would be by a ‘singlet state’ and
‘triplet state’ respectively. In the singlet state the two spin-1/2 particles are anti-alined and in
an anti-symmetrical state (entity C), while in a triplet state the two spin-1/2 particles are alined
and in a symmetrical state (entity B). In the specific case of (C), and taking into account the
anti-symmetric spin analog, the state of the entity Ψ is given by:
1√
2
{(
1
0
)
⊗
(
0
1
)
−
(
0
1
)
⊗
(
1
0
)}
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Equivalently, the liar entity can be represented by other linear combinations of
(
1
0
)
⊗
(
0
1
)
and
(
0
1
)
⊗
(
1
0
)
, provided the coefficients have equal amplitude and the squared amplitudes
add to one (such that total probability of finding the entity in one of the two possible states after
a measurement equals one). In a similar manner the liar paradox in the ‘symmetrical’ case (B)
can be represented by the triplet state:
1√
2
{(
1
0
)
⊗
(
1
0
)
+
(
0
1
)
⊗
(
0
1
)}
The projection operators which make sentence 1, respectively sentence 2, true are:
P1,true =
(
1 0
0 0
)
⊗ 12 P2,true = 11 ⊗
(
1 0
0 0
)
The projection operators that make the sentences false are obtained by switching the elements 1
and 0 on the diagonal of the matrix. These four projection operators represent all possible ‘logical’
interactions (measurement interactions) between the cognitive observer and the liar entity. During
the measurement process carried out on the entities (B) and (C), the observer attributes truth-
value to the sentences in a repetitive manner: in case of entity (B) it is a repetition of true-states
(resp. false-states) depending on whether an initial true (resp. false) state was presupposed. In
the case of entity (C) it will be an alternation between true-states and false states, no matter
which state was presupposed.
Finally, let us indicate the main points necessary in the derivation of a full description of the
original double liar paradox, i.e., case (A), and see what pattern of truth assignments follows
during the measurement (we refer to [23] for a more detailed discussion of the derivation of the
results). While for cases (B) and (C) the dimensionality of the coupled Hilbert space C2⊗C2 is
sufficient, a space of higher dimension has to be used for case (A). This is due to the fact that
no initial state can be found in the restricted space C2⊗C2, such that application of the four
true–false projection operators results in four orthogonal states respectively representing the four
truth–falsehood states. The existence of such a superposition state — with equal amplitudes of
its components — is required to describe the state of the entity before and after the measurement
process. Since the truth-values of the two sentences in the paradox are not anymore coupled like
it was the case for (B) and (C), the dynamical pattern of truth assignment by the observer is not
anymore a two-step process but a four-step process. Therefore, the entity should be described in
a 4 dimensional Hilbert space for each sentence. The Hilbert space needed to describe the Double
Liar (A) is therefore C4 ⊗ C4.
The initial un-measured superposition state — Ψ0 — of the Double Liar (A) is given by
following superposition of the four true–false states:
1
2


0
0
1
0
⊗

0
1
0
0
+

0
1
0
0
⊗

0
0
0
1
+

0
0
0
1
⊗

1
0
0
0
+

1
0
0
0
⊗

0
0
1
0


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Each term in this superposition state is the consecutive state which is reached in the course
of time, when the paradox is reasoned through. The truth–falsehood values attributed to these
states, refer to the chosen measurement projectors.
Making a sentence true or false in the act of measurement, is described by the appropriate pro-
jection operators in C4 ⊗ C4. In the case we make sentence 1 (resp. sentence 2) true we get:
P1,true =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
⊗ 12
P2,true = 11 ⊗

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0

The projectors for the false-states are constructed by placing the 1 on the final diagonal place:
P1,false =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
⊗ 12
P2,false = 11 ⊗

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1

Starting by making one of the sentences of (A) either true or false, by logical inference, the four
consecutive states are run through repeatedly. In [23] a continuous parameter t was introduced to
reflect ‘reasoning time’ of the cognitive observer. This allowed to give a time-ordered description of
the cyclic change of state present in the measurement process of the liar paradox. A Hamiltonian
H can be constructed such that the unitary evolution operator U(t) — with U(t) = e−iHt —
describes this cyclic change.
The dynamical picture of the Double Liar cognitive entity (A) is therefore as follows: when
submitted to measurement, the entity starts its truth–falsehood cycle; when left un-measured the
entity remains in the potentiality state. This follows immediately from the fact that the initial
state Ψ0 is left unchanged by the dynamical evolution U(t):
Ψ0(t) = Ψ0
because Ψ0 is a time invariant, as an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian H. Because of this time-
independence, the state Ψ0 describes the cognitive entity of the liar paradox A, regardless of
the observer. The highly contextual nature of the Double Liar (A) — its unavoidable dynamics
induced by the measurement process — implies that intrinsically it can not expose its complete
nature, analogous to the quantum entities of the micro-physical world.
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4 Potentiality States versus Classical Emergence
4.1 Potentiality State of a Soccer Team versus its Stable Classical Dynamical Pat-
tern
Classical emergent properties of a system are defined by dynamical patterns related to its sub-
systems. Each of these subsystems can be described in a state space, and therefore the emergent
properties which are identified with the collection of the subsystems, can be represented in es-
sentially the same space. When potentiality states are involved, the emergent entity needs to be
described in a higher dimensional state space, as the example of the liar paradox shows where
the potentiality state is a superposition of tensor products of vectors representing the individual
sentences. Crucial for the existence of a potentiality state is the contextuality in the measurement
process, which causes a ‘collapse’ of the potentiality state into one of the mutual exclusive possible
eigenstates. Let us now clarify the main differences between a classical emergent pattern due to
dynamical evolution of a complex system, and the new kind of emergence related to the existence
of potentiality states, by the concrete example of a soccer team.
A simple example of an entity represented with a potentiality state is given by a soccer team,
e.g. the team of R.F.C. Anderlecht of Belgium (abbreviated: the A-team), consisting of eleven
soccer players. The classical emergent description of such soccer team would involve analyzing the
team in terms of the individual motions of the players and would reflect the dynamical pattern
which is present during a game: e.g., whether the team as a whole is attacking or defending at
one moment in time. The properties of the soccer team are determined by the capabilities of each
player (how fast each player can run, how good they can pass the ball etc.), and on the correlation
which exists between the players, i.e., how the members of the team play together as a team.
Hence, the whole soccer team can be identified with the eleven members of the team and the
team can be represented in terms of the descriptions of the individual players: indeed, once the
movement of each player is known, the movement of the team as a whole is known too. This is
what we would call the team as a ‘classical’ emergent entity. Notice, that when the eleven players
have left the field after the game, the entity of the team stops to exist. Indeed, the movements
of the eleven players become incoherent after the game: each player leaves to his own home, and
until they have to play the next match, they have stopped to be, in classical emergent terms, part
of the larger entity ‘a soccer team’. For instance, one of the players of the A-team could be a
foreigner who has to play a game for his native country before the next match of the A-team.
Obviously, while he’s playing the match for his native country, he cannot be playing a match for
the A-team. Therefore, while he’s playing for his home country, the classical emergent entity ‘the
A-team’ defined by the eleven soccer players does not exhibit the typical dynamical patterns of a
soccer team playing a match, and therefore the entity does not exist at that moment in time.
If we elaborate this example in terms of the potentiality state concept, we obtain the following.
The state of the entity ‘the A-team’ is defined by the possible instances of the team as a collection
of the individual players. By this we mean that when the eleven players are on the (same) soccer
field playing a game for the A-team, they are in fact actualizing a potential game, simply by the
act of playing the game. The emergent concept of ‘the A-team’ is more than just the collection
of the movements of the eleven players. Even when the eleven players are not actually playing
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a game, they are still a ‘potential team’. The instance of the team playing a game is created
at the moment the A-team is actually playing a game. To make this more clear, let us consider
the following situation. The A-team has qualified for the final of the Belgian soccer cup in which
they will have to play against the winner of the other semi-final match Bruges-Ghent which is
played a day later than the A-team semi-final. Then ‘the A-team playing the cup final’ can be
considered as an emergent entity, defined by the eleven players who are preparing themselves for
the final. A day later the match Bruges-Ghent will be actually played and the adversary of the
A-team in the final will be known. At the moment the final is played, the instance ‘the A-team
is playing’ is activated, and potentiality of ‘the A-team playing a game’ collapses into one of two
mutually exclusive possibilities, i.e., a final against Bruges or a final against Ghent. Notice that
even when the A-team is not actually playing, the emergent concept defined by the potentiality
of letting the eleven players play a game is still present. As such, ‘the A-team playing the final’
can be viewed as a potentiality state of two possible instances: one concerns the final against the
(let’s say defending) team of Bruges, and one against the (let’s say attacking) team of Ghent.
Depending on which team reaches the final, the A-team will behave differently because they have
to choose between different tactics. Nevertheless, before the score of the semi-final Bruges-Ghent
is determined, potentially both tactics could be followed. It is not just the state of the A-team
which decides how the final will look like, also the adversary will be decisive, and the result of the
game Bruges-Ghent is not influenced by the state of the A-team.
The differences between classical concept of emergence and the emergent behavior which is
established by the presence of potentiality states, resemble the differences in dynamical evolution
of a classical system versus a quantum system. The evolution of a classical system is continuous,
and the act of measurement does not influence the results, the measurements are purely non-
perturbative observations. As such, the dynamical pattern of the system as a whole is identified
by the dynamical evolution of the sub-systems. In other words, the state of the compound system
evolves continuously in time.
The dynamical evolution for a quantum particle, upon which no measurements are carried
out, is given by the Schro¨dinger equation, which also describes a continuous evolution of the state
of the entity. However, standard quantum theory predicts a non-continuous evolution during the
measurement process, such that the state of the system changes instantaneously towards one of the
possible eigenstates corresponding with the observable. Similarly, the potentiality of the eleven
players of the A-team to play a game against Bruges or a game against Ghent defines an emergent
entity. Before the result of Bruges-Ghent is known, potentially the A-team can play a game
against Ghent, but also potentially against Bruges. Nevertheless, only one of these possible finals
can actually be played. Which final will be played, does not depend on the A-team alone, but also
on the adversary who manages to qualify: Bruges or Ghent. This dependence on the context (i.e.,
the semi-final between Bruges and Ghent) causes the non-continuous evolution of ‘the A-team
playing the final’ from a potentiality of both games towards one of the specific instances. As such,
one can regard the concept of potentiality state as a possible way to generalize the concept of
classical emergence to cases where also contextuality is important. Eventually, this should lead
to a general theory capable of describing on the one hand the continuous evolution of a system
in the absence of contextual interaction and on the other hand the discontinuous evolution of the
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system during the interaction process with the environment during which in a highly contextual
way one of the possibilities present in the potentiality state of the system is effectively actualized.
4.2 Violation of Bell Inequalities for the Soccer Teams
Let us now show that also in the case of a soccer team we can define a set of experiments for
which Bell inequalities are violated, indicating the presence of a potentiality state. Depending on
the context only one of mutual exclusive potential outcomes will be actually realized during the
experiment. The entity that we consider is the set of 22 soccer players of two teams playing a cup
final.
The first experiment e1 consists in letting someone give money to a player of team A such that
he will cause his team to lose the cup final. If his team actually loses the cup final, the experiment
e1 is said to yield the outcome o1(up), if team A wins the final, the experimental outcome is
o1(down). Taking into account that the final is played until one of the two teams wins (e.g., in the
case of a draw the final could be decided with a number of penalties), the experiment will always
give one of these two possible outcomes. The second experiment e2 consists in looking whether
the referee gives a player of team A a yellow card or not. If he actually gives a yellow card to
at least one player of team A, the outcome is o2(up), and o2(down) otherwise. The experiment
e3 consists in letting someone give money to a player of team B such that he will cause his team
to lose the cup final. If team B actually loses the cup final, the experiment e3 is said to yield
the outcome o3(up), if team B wins the final, the experimental outcome is o3(down). The fourth
and last experiment e4 consists in looking whether the referee gives a player of team B a yellow
card. If he actually gives a yellow card to at least one player of team B, the outcome is o4(up),
and o4(down) otherwise. Finally, we assume that the referee has a bad character such that during
the final he will definitely give a yellow card to at least one player of team A and one player of
team B. Let us now look at the coincidence experiments e13, e14, e23 and e24. The experiment
e14 consists in giving a player of team A money with the aim of letting team A lose the final,
and looking whether a player of team B has received a yellow card. Of course, even if the other
players of team A are playing very good, the bribed player can make intentionally mistakes like
own-goals etc. such that even in that case team A loses the final. Therefore, the experiment e14
gives the outcome (o1(up), o4(up)) and the expectation value E14 = +1. Similarly, we obtain that
E23 = +1. Also, due to our assumption about the bad-character referee, we can deduce that the
coincidence experiment e24 yields always the outcome (o2(up), o4(up)) such that the expectation
value is given by E24 = +1. Finally, let us look at the coincidence experiment e13. In this case,
both a player of team A and a player of team B will receive money to let their respective team
lose the cup final. However, only one of the two teams can actually lose the final. Therefore, the
coincidence experiment e13 can only yield the outcome (o1(up), o3(down)) or (o1(down), o3(up)),
resulting in an expectation value E13 = −1. Let us now calculate the terms of Bell inequalities,
|E13 − E14|+ |E23 + E24| = | − 1− 1|+ |+ 1 + 1|
= +2 + 2
= +4
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and it follows that Bell inequalities are violated. This violation is due to the explicit contextuality
of the experimental outcomes. To make this more clear, we could also specify in the definition
of the experiments e1 and e3 the amount of money which is given to the players. For instance, if
we specify that in experiment e1 the bribed player is very poor, and the amount of money is to
be one billion dollars, then he will probably do everything possible in order to let his team lose
the final. If on the other hand, the player in experiment e3 is already rich, and the amount of
money is only 100.000 dollars, he will probably not do such extreme things like making a lot of
own-goals etc., which the other, poor player will probably do to earn his billion dollars. This shows
that also in the case of deterministic coincidence experiments (e13 always yielding the outcome
(o1(up), o3(down))) one can violate Bell-inequalities.
The reason why Bell-inequalities are also violated in the deterministic case is situated in the
fact that only one of two possible but mutually exclusive situations can occur (i.e., only one of the
two teams can lose the cup final), and that before the experiments are actually performed both
experimental outcomes are possible. It is the contextual nature of the experiments which defines
which of the possible experimental results will actually occur. This shows that the emergent
phenomenon of two teams playing the cup final should be described with a potentiality state,
such that in one of the possible cases team A loses the final, and in the other team B loses the
final. Depending on which experiment is actually performed (which player is given what amount
of money), the actually played final will be different. Therefore, the final cannot be regarded only
as the stable dynamical pattern exhibited by the two teams of soccer players playing a game.
5 Conclusions
The above examples — the ‘vessels of water’, ‘liar paradox’ and ‘the soccer team’ — illustrate
the various ways in which potentiality states can be identified in reality. The emergent properties
which the potentiality states define, depend on the particular nature of the entity. For the vessels
of water example, the appearance of potentiality states indicates the presence of a particular
quantum aspect, which can be demonstrated by the violation of Bell inequalities. For the liar
paradox example we have worked out a full and detailed quantum description which shows the pure
quantum mechanical nature of the example. The potentiality states in this case are superposition
states. We mention that the example of the liar paradox shows that the reality of conceptual space
is quite different from great part of the macroscopic world. It seems that it contains ‘Hilbert space-
like’ features, which makes it quantum-like. We have shown on the example of a soccer team that
the emergence due to potentiality states has a quite different status than the one of the emergent
dynamical patterns that are identified in classical physics. The emergent potentiality states are
ontological states within the formalism, and not connected to dynamical patterns alone. Also in
the case of the soccer teams playing a match, one can define experiments such that Bell inequalities
are violated, indicating the contextual nature of the defined experiments for these entities.
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